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Credit Derivatives as a Commitment Device:
Evidence from the Cost of Corporate Debt
Gi H. Kim∗
ABSTRACT
When a firm writes incomplete debt contracts, its limited ability to commit to not strategically de-
fault and renegotiate its debt requires the firm to pay higher yields to its creditors. Hedged by credit
derivatives, creditors have stronger bargaining power in the case of debt renegotiation, which ex-ante
demotivates the firm to default strategically. In this paper, I aim to investigate theoretically and em-
pirically whether credit derivatives could help reduce the cost of debt contracting stemming from the
possibility of strategic default. I find that firms with a priori high strategic default incentives experi-
ence a relatively large reduction in their corporate bond spreads after the introduction of credit default
swaps (CDS) written on their debt. This result is robust to controlling for the endogeneity of CDS in-
troduction. My finding is consistent with the presence of CDS reducing the strategic default-related
cost of corporate debt, suggesting the beneficial role of credit derivatives as a commitment device for
the borrower to repay the lender.
JEL classification: G10, G13, G30, G33.
Keywords: Credit Default Swaps, Empty Creditors, Cost of Corporate Debt, Corporate Bond Yields
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When a firm cannot credibly commit to repay its debt, its shareholders may have incentives to default
strategically under the firm’s financial distress. Strategic default could allow them to extract a sub-
stantial fraction of firm value from debt holders through debt renegotiation. Since the pioneering work
by Hart and Moore (1994, 1998) and Bolton and Scharfstein (1990, 1996), the possibility of strategic
default has been widely recognized to alter the relationship between shareholders and debt holders,
which in turn affects the firm’s optimal debt structure and debt valuation, among other things. It
can reduce a firm’s debt capacity by imposing the extra cost on its debt financing. In fact, it is well
documented in the literature both theoretically and empirically that the threat of strategic default
increases the cost of debt (e.g., Fan and Sundaresan (2000) and Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007)).
Credit default swap (CDS) could reduce the strategic default-related cost of debt by helping share-
holders commit credibly to be less engaged in strategic default. CDS can strengthen debt holders’
bargaining power in debt renegotiation upon a firm’s default. Specifically, when debt holders are in-
sured through CDS, they stand to lose less after the failure of renegotiation, and are therefore less
forgiving during debt renegotiation.1 The better bargaining position enables debt holders to make
fewer concessions to shareholders. As a result, shareholders are less incentivized to attempt to strate-
gically renegotiate down the promised debt payments to their own advantage. The reduced threat of
strategic default should then be reflected in the value of the firm’s debt.
The goal of this paper is to investigate theoretically and empirically whether the presence of CDS
contracts that are traded on the firm’s debt relates to firms’ strategic default incentives, which should
be incorporated in the value of the firm’s debt. More specifically, I argue and show theoretically that
the presence of traded CDS should result into higher (lower) values (interest rate spreads) of the firm’s
debt by reducing the firm’s likelihood of strategic default. (I refer to this effect of CDS as “commitment
benefit of CDS”.) Moreover, I examine empirically whether the firm’s bond spreads are lower due to the
reduced strategic default premium when a CDS contract starts trading on the firm’s debt.
It is a challenging task to establish empirically the causal relationship between a firm’s bond
spreads and the onset of CDS trading, since the timing of CDS introduction for a given firm could
be endogenous. For example, CDS trading may be initiated in anticipation of the deterioration in a
firms’ creditworthiness, which should act against finding a reduction (if any) in bond spreads with
the introduction of CDS. To mitigate the endogeneity issue, I employ an identification strategy that is
similar to a difference-in-differences framework. The basic idea is to sort firms on the basis of their
1This reasoning is valid only if debt renegotiation does not constitute a credit event that triggers the CDS payments. Even
though many CDS contracts written before 2009 included restructuring clauses in a contract, by which debt restructuring for-
mally constitutes a credit event, in practice there is often significant uncertainty for creditors whether a particular restructuring
qualifies. For example, debt restructuring in the U.S. corporate segment has never triggered a credit event, given the general
disagreement about what constitutes a restructuring event.
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strategic default incentives before the onset of CDS trading, and then examine how these firms behave
differently with the introduction of CDS in terms of their bond spreads.
The intuition is that the commitment benefits of CDS should be larger for firms that face the severe
problem of limited commitment in the absence of CDS, i.e., firms that are expected (by creditors) to
be more likely to be engaged in strategic default in the event of a firm’s financial distress. If CDS
plays a role as a commitment device by reducing the strategic default-related cost of contracting, we
should observe a larger reduction in the cost of debt for firms that would have suffered from the higher
cost of strategic default in the absence of CDS. By exploiting the cross-sectional variation in strategic
default incentives, my results could be less contaminated by the endogeneity in the timing of CDS
introduction.
To convey the intuition more clearly, I present a theoretical framework by extending a stylized
model of strategic debt service à la Fan and Sundaresan (2000) and Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007),
among others. The model allows me to derive the relationship between the magnitude of reductions
in the likelihood of strategic default (hence, increases in debt values) and three firm characteristics—
referred to as “strategic variables”: (1) shareholder bargaining power, (2) liquidation costs, and (3)
renegotiation frictions. In the model, CDS provides creditors with better outside options (i.e., the pay-
ment from CDS sellers that is presumably higher than the bond’s post-default value) in their renegoti-
ation with the firm’s shareholders. The creditors’ strengthened bargaining position due to the external
options results in the lower payoffs of shareholders through debt renegotiation, and decreases the op-
tion value of strategic default ex-ante. The option value of strategic default falls most for firms whose
shareholders would originally have high incentives for strategic default, such as firms with high share-
holder bargaining power, high liquidation costs, or fewer renegotiation frictions. Therefore, the model
predicts a positive relationship between the commitment benefits of CDS and shareholder bargaining
power or liquidation costs, whereas they are negatively related to renegotiation frictions.
I test empirical predictions derived from the model using a (unbalanced) panel data set of 136
U.S. firms whose bonds are publicly traded, and for which CDS trading was initiated between 2001
and 2008. My empirical model, which is conducted in a firm-fixed and time-fixed OLS regression
with an interaction term, essentially regresses the changes in a firm’s bond spreads followed by the
onset of CDS trading on its strategic variable measured at the time of the onset of CDS trading. I
proxy for strategic variables with commonly used firm-specific variables in the literature, namely,
the concentration of CEO equity ownership for shareholder bargaining power, asset intangibility for
liquidation costs, and the dispersion of bondholders for the probability of renegotiation breakdown.
My empirical tests yield two main findings. First, while bond spreads are shown to increase for
3
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the average firm in my sample, which is consistent with the results of existing studies (e.g., Ashcraft
and Santos (2009)), I find a relatively large reduction in spreads for firms with high strategic default
incentives, such as (1) high shareholder bargaining power, (2) high liquidation costs, and (3) low rene-
gotiation frictions. These results may suggest that the firms most vulnerable to the threat of strategic
default in the absence of CDS would benefit from the presence of CDS through reductions in share-
holders’ incentives for strategic defaults, hence the bond spread.
Second, I show that these observed patterns between bond spreads and strategic incentives are
more pronounced for the riskier firms in my sample. Specifically, when the sample of firms is divided
into two sub-groups based on their credit rating at the time of CDS introduction, namely, AAA/AA/A
or BBB, the effects of CDS are seen to be strong, especially for firms that belong to the subgroup
with lower credit ratings. This result may be in line with the fact that debt holders’ concerns about
shareholders’ strategic default would become more serious, hence the strategic default premium is
higher in bond spreads when the firm is close to financial distress.
Robustness tests address three main potential concerns. The first is that my reasoning throughout
the paper hinges on the assumption that creditors become hedged (so-called empty creditors) in the
presence of traded CDS contracts.2 This assumption may not hold if the majority of CDS trading
consists of “naked CDS,” i.e., CDS purchasers are not creditors of the firm. To address this concern, I
consider a subsample of firms that has a low ratio of the (notional) amount of CDS to the amount of a
firm’s total debt. By focusing on those firms with a reasonably low CDS amount, I could exclude from
consideration firms with a vast amount of CDS (which is sometimes even larger than the amount of
total debt), for which many CDS tradings might be done by speculators, not creditors.3
The second concern is dealing with the endogeneity of strategic variables employed in the analysis.
It could be argued that my strategic variable is a noisy proxy and so could be correlated with other
firm characteristics than strategic default incentives per se. To mitigate this concern, I control for
other relevant firm characteristics, such as risk, information transparency, and liquidity, which could
be correlated with both my strategic variable and the CDS effect on bond spreads. In fact, these
firm characteristics are studied in the literature as the potential factor relating to the impact of CDS
with respect to bond spreads (e.g., Ashcraft and Santos (2009); Oehmke and Zawadowski (2014, 2015),
among others).
2This type of creditor was first dubbed “empty creditor” by some legal scholars (e.g., Hu and Black (2008a,b)) to refer to
creditors that have obtained insurance (by purchasing the CDS contract) against the firm’s default, and so cease to be concerned
about whether the firm will fulfill their debt payment.
3One caveat to using the outstanding position of CDS is that it includes both buying and selling positions of all investors,
whether hedger or speculator. Ideally I would use buying positions of hedgers alone, not speculators, which I cannot distinguish
due to the unavailability of investor-level data on CDS positions. Alternatively, the trading volume of CDS might be useful to
tell whether the CDS trading is less naked, but I do not have an access to those data, either.
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The final concern is that the introduction of CDS may be endogenous, which could not be fully
accounted for by my control variables in a regression framework. Based on the explosive growth of
CDS markets over my sample period (as shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2),4 however, it seems to me
that a technology (or financial innovation) shock might facilitate CDS trading. As the markets expand
and become more liquid, the timing of CDS trading is likely to be exogenously affected by the ease with
which traders locate prices and counterparties owing to the accumulated experience and knowledge of
CDS trading. Notwithstanding, I address endogeneity concerns further by performing a propensity
score matched sample analysis (Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)). Matched firms, identified as firms that
have never traded CDS but have similar characteristics to firms with CDS, are used as a control group.
This paper contributes to a growing literature of the implications of credit derivatives on corpora-
tions, particularly corporate debt financing. To the best of my knowledge, my paper is one of the first
to address the impact of CDS on the cost of debt through the strategic default channel. Arping (2014)
examines the impact of CDS on lending relationships and develops a theoretical model where CDS
have positive implications for borrower incentives ex-ante. Norden and Wagner (2008) document that
CDS trading affects the syndicated corporate loan market by providing a lead bank with a hedging
opportunity. Narayanan and Uzmanoglu (2014) analyze the relation between CDS and the strategic
behavior of firms but do not compare bond values for before and after the introduction of CDS. Saretto
and Tookes (2013) examine the impact of CDS on a firm’s debt capacity, but not debt values, which is
the focus of my study. Das, Kalimipalli, and Nayak (2014) investigate the impact of CDS trading on
the corporate bond market, focusing on its efficiency and liquidity. Ismailescu and Phillips (2014) show
that CDS initiation provides significant price efficiency benefits in the underlying sovereign market.
An important precursor to my paper is Ashcraft and Santos (2009), which also examines the con-
ditional and unconditional effects of CDS on underlying corporate bond spreads.5 My paper is close to
their study in that it also investigates changes in a firm’s bond spreads before and after the onset of
CDS trading. However, Ashcraft and Santos focus on different mechanisms through which CDS affects
bond prices, so-called hedging and information, not the strategic default channel, which is the main
contribution of my paper. Ashcraft and Santos document that safe and informationally transparent
firms benefit more from the presence of CDS, whereas I contend that the main beneficiaries are the
firms most vulnerable to shareholders’ strategic default incentives.
My study sheds light on the ongoing debate over empty creditor problems, the phenomenon that
4Figure 1 shows that the notional value of outstanding CDS increased from US$ 1 trillion at the beginning of 2001 to US$ 62
trillion by the end of 2007. Figure 2 shows that the number of firms with CDS trading increases every year.
5Using the sample of Asian firms, Shim and Zhu (2014) also conduct a similar study, for which they document different
results from those in Ashcraft and Santos (2009).
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empty creditors—creditors hedged with CDS—may have low incentives to participate in debt renego-
tiation and as a result, force distressed firms into bankruptcies even when continuation is optimal.
On this ground, some legal scholars (e.g., Hu and Black (2008a,b)) propose the removal of those credi-
tors’ voting rights in a debt restructuring process. In a similar vein, Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang
(2014) show that the presence of CDS increases the credit risk of reference firms.6 Danis (2016) shows
that the availability of CDS results in creditors’ lower participation in distressed debt renegotiation.
In contrast, some scholars argue about the beneficial role of empty creditors as a commitment device
(e.g., Bolton and Oehmke (2011); Campello and Matta (2011)). Using the structural model accounting
for both negative and positive effects of empty creditors, Danis and Gamba (2014) find the effect of
reducing the cost of corporate debt dominates, which is consistent with the main findings in my paper.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section I presents a theoretical framework of how
CDS affect the probability of strategic default, hence the strategic default premium in bond yields.
The data and empirical methodology are discussed in Section II. Section III reports empirical findings.
Section IV presents the results of the robustness tests. Section V concludes.
I. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
In this section, I present the theoretical framework for the effect of CDS on the strategic default
incentives of shareholders and accordingly, the cost of a firm’s debt. In doing so, I follow closely Davy-
denko and Strebulaev’s (2007) strategic debt service model with renegotiation frictions. Their model
is extended to allow for CDS-protected debt holders to bargain with shareholders during debt renego-
tiation. From this model, testable implications are derived on both the unconditional and conditional
effect of CDS on bond spreads.
The basic setup is similar to Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007), which is: debt payments consist of
a perpetual coupon payment, c, and equity holders have the option to default on this payment (and will
do so when the firm value falls below an endogenous default threshold). If the firm defaults on its debt,
it can be liquidated at a proportional cost α ∈ [0, 1]. Debt holders have absolute priority in liquidation,
leaving them with (1− α)VD.7 Costly liquidation could be avoided by debt renegotiation, and a failure
of renegotiation drives the firm to be liquidated through a formal bankruptcy process. To account
for renegotiation frictions, it is assumed that renegotiation fails with probability q ∈ [0, 1].8 Once debt
6Bedendo, Cathcart, and El-Jahel (2015), however, do not find an association between CDS and credit deterioration.
7Tax consideration is omitted for the simplicity of the model. The model’s implication does not change with the tax advantage
of debt.
8When q is close to zero, there are few frictions in the debt renegotiation, and there is scope for shareholders to extract firm
value from debt holders. Where q equals 1, the debt cannot be renegotiated and claims are settled based on absolute priority
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renegotiation is initiated, the two parties bargain over the value of the firm at renegotiation, VR, which
is divided according to the equilibrium outcome of a Nash bargaining game between equity holders and
debt holders, with the optimal sharing rule, θ∗, being determined to maximize the aggregate surplus
to both parties.
Now I aim to allow for this model to accommodate debt holders who have obtained insurance against
a firm’s default by purchasing CDS. I suppose that debt holders have purchased the constant amount
of CDS to be paid (with cash settlement) by the CDS seller upon a firm’s default, the amount of cash
denoted by piVR, pi ∈ [0, α].9 Debt holders keep in their possession the defaulted debt, which is worth
the post-default (or recovery) value, (1−α)VR. That is, pi is equal to zero if debt holders are not hedged
at all, α if fully hedged, and in-between if partially hedged.10 The market practice would only allow the
CDS payment to be triggered once debt renegotiation fails and the firm enters the formal bankruptcy
process. This extended setup enables me to rewrite the optimal sharing rule of debt renegotiation in
the case of debt holders being protected by CDS as follows:
θ∗ = argmax [θVR − 0]η [(1− θ)VR − (1− α+ pi)VR]1−η
= η (α− pi) , pi ∈ [0, α]
(1)
where η ∈ [0, 1] represents the bargaining power of equity holders (accordingly, 1−η for the bargaining
power of debt holders). With this sharing rule, equity holders’ payoff is θ∗VR and debt holders’ (1 −
θ∗)VR.
Equity holders’ surplus from bargaining is θ∗VR, which remains unchanged with the introduction of
CDS, whereas debt holders’ surplus is affected (reduced) by the presence of CDS protection due to their
increased outside options. More specifically, their alternative to agreeing for renegotiation is to make
the renegotiation fail, in which case they would receive the CDS payment, (1− α+ pi)VR. This amount
is higher than the amount they would have received after the failure of renegotiation in the absence
of CDS, i.e., the recovery value of debt, (1 − α)VR. Noticeably, the increase in debt holders’ outside
option is positively related to the amount of CDS. This CDS-induced increase in outside options would
provide debt holders with a strengthened bargaining position and result in a reduced concession to
shareholders (i.e., θ∗ becomes lower as θ∗ would be ηα in the absence of CDS) by the amount of ηpiVR.
With the optimal sharing rule, contingent claims techniques (e.g., Dixit and Pindyck (1994)) enable
rules.
9The model assumes that the CDS amount, pi, is exogenously determined in order to focus on its effect once chosen. The
endogenous choice of the CDS amount, however, would not alter the model’s main predictions significantly.
10The case of pi being greater than α indicates that debt holders are excessively hedged, i.e., have purchased even a larger
amount of CDS than the value of total debt outstanding. In this paper, over-hedging is not considered because in this case, all
bargaining power goes to debt holders irrespective of the amount of CDS, and debt renegotiation would never happen.
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us to derive the optimal default boundary, VR11:
VR(pi; η, α, q) =
(
1
1− (1− q)η(α− pi)
)( −λ
1− λ
)
c
r
, pi ∈ [0, α], η, α, q ∈ [0, 1]. (2)
Differentiating VR with respect to the amount of CDS, pi, yields:
∂VR
∂pi
= − (1− (1− q)η(α− pi))−2
( −λ
1− λ
)
c
r
< 0, (3)
implying that the default boundary shifts downwards in the presence of CDS. The lower default bound-
ary indicates that equity holders would continue to service their debt at lower asset values and keep
the firm afloat longer.
The value of debt, D(V ) can be derived by:
D(V, pi; η, α, q) = (1− PR) c
r
+ [1− (1− q)η(α− pi)− qα]VRPR
= (1− PR) c
r
+R× PR,
(4)
where the risk-neutral default (or renegotiation) probability, PR, and the expected recovery for debt
holders in default, R is given:
PR =
(
V
VR
)λ
, R = (1− q)(1− η(α− pi)VR + q(1− α)VR. (5)
Equation (4) implies the value of debt is the renegotiation-probability weighted average of the value of
the perpetual coupon stream and the expected recovery rate. The value of debt can be rewritten as:
D(V, pi; η, α, q) =
c
r
− h(pi; η, α, q) 1
1− λ
[
1− λ
−λ
r
c
]λ
r
c
V λ (6)
where
h(pi; η, α, q) = (1− (1− q)η(α− pi)− qαλ)(1− (1− q)η(α− pi))λ−1 (7)
The interest rate spread on debt, s = c/D, depends on the parameter pi (and η, α, q) through the
function h(·) where the value of h(·) is positively related to the spreads. My main hypotheses on bond
spreads are obtained by analyzing the partial derivatives of h(pi; η, α, q). First, I examine whether the
11λ is a negative constant that depends on firm characteristics and risk-free rate:
−
√
2r
σ2
≤ λ =
(
1
2
− r − β
σ2
)
−
√(
1
2
− r − β
σ2
)2
+
2r
σ2
< 0.
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higher CDS amount pi corresponds to lower spreads by differentiating h with respect to pi:
∂h
∂pi
= λ(1− q)η(1− (1− q)η(α− pi))λ−2(qα(1− λ) + (1− (1− q)η(α− pi))) < 0, (8)
implying that bond spreads become lower in the presence of CDS (i.e., pi 6= 0) than in the absence of
CDS (i.e., pi = 0). This expression leads to my first hypothesis:
H1. (CDS and bond spreads) The presence of traded CDS reduces shareholders’ incentives to
default strategically by strengthening debt holders’ bargaining power position in default. As a result,
all else being equal, bond spreads are lower when CDS contracts trades on the firm’s debt.
Second, I demonstrate that the magnitude of the reductions in bond spread due to CDS increases
with equity holders’ bargaining power (η) and liquidation costs (α), and decreases with renegotiation
frictions (q). The intuition is that the decrease in bond spreads is strongest for firms that have the
highest strategic default incentives ex-ante. Indeed, the cross-derivatives of h(·) with respect to pi and
η, α, or q show the expected signs, as follows:
∂2h
∂pi∂η
= λ(1− q)(1− (1− q)η(α− pi))λ−3
× [qα(1− λ)(1 + (1− q)η(1− λ)(α− pi)) + (1− (1− q)η(α− pi)(1− (1− q)ηλ(α− pi))] < 0,
∂2h
∂pi∂α
= λ(1− λ)(1− q)2η2(1− (1− q)η(α− pi))λ−3(qα(2− λ) + (1− (1− q)ηα(α− pi)) < 0,
∂2h
∂pi∂q
= −λη[qα(1− λ)(1 + (1− q)η(1− λ)) + (1− (1− q)η(α− pi))(1− (1− q)ηαλ(α− pi))]
× (1− (1− q)η(α− pi))λ−3 > 0.
(9)
Equation 9 implies that the absolute magnitude of bond spread sensitivity to CDS would increase with
η and α, but decrease with q. These relations can be more clearly seen in Figure 3, where I plot the
graphs of bond spreads with respect to pi and each of three parameters. These expressions lead to my
second hypothesis:
H2. (The sensitivity of bond spreads to CDS) The decrease in bond spreads is strongest for
firms that have the highest strategic default incentives ex-ante, such as:
H2a: high shareholder bargaining power,
H2b: high firm liquidation costs,
9
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H2c: low renegotiation frictions.
Hence, all else being equal, the absolute value of the spread sensitivity to CDS increases with share-
holder bargaining power and liquidation costs, and decreases with renegotiation frictions.
The possibility of strategic default is a concern, especially for debt holders whose firm is close to
financial distress. In this case, the relation identified in hypothesis H2 should be stronger for firms
that are close to default. In fact, one can see this by taking derivatives each of ∂
2h
∂pi∂η ,
∂2h
∂pi∂α , and
∂2h
∂pi∂q
with respect to V :
∂D(V )3
∂pi∂η∂V
< 0,
∂D(V )3
∂pi∂α∂V
< 0,
∂D(V )3
∂pi∂q∂V
> 0, (10)
Note that these expressions are shown in terms of the value of debt, D(V ). That is, the relation in
H2 is more salient among firms with low V , which translates into firms whose distance to the default
threshold is closer (all else being equal), i.e., riskier firms. Hence, my third hypothesis can be derived
as:
H3. (Bond spread sensitivity and firm risk) All else being equal, the relations identified in H2
are more pronounced in the risky firm.
II. Data and Empirical Methodology
A. Data Source and Sample Selection
I construct a panel dataset of investment grade corporate bonds of publicly traded U.S. firms that
initiated CDS trading during the period January 2001—December 2008.12 I begin by building the
sample of CDS firms (i.e., firms that have traded CDS) using the Markit CDS Pricing database as
follows.13 I start with CRSP-Compustat firms that have traded CDS by selecting only those that have
ever had quote information in the Markit database. For each CDS firm, I then identify the first date
(i.e., quarter) in which a US$-dominated CDS contract was traded at a five-year maturity. This quarter
is used in the analysis to indicate the onset of CDS trading. I remove all firms that initiated trading in
the first month of 2001, when the Markit data begin, because of uncertainty about the starting dates
12Although CDS have existed since the early 1990s, the CDS market grew rapidly and became liquid in this later period.
13Markit aggregates daily quotes of CDS prices for firms with CDS trading from major CDS dealers. Markit is used as a
benchmark source of CDS pricing because its coverage is quite broad and it currently provides CDS spread information for most
corporations with nontrivial CDS trading.
10
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of these firms’ CDS trading.14 I obtain 869 CDS firms with CRSP-Compustat identifiers.
From these, I select only CDS firms for which bond information (e.g. prices and characteristics)
is available. Bond pricing information is obtained from TRACE and NAIC, two bond transaction
databases widely used in the recent literature.1516 I augment TRACE’s limited coverage in earlier
years with NAIC, and delete firms that have never had bond pricing information in either database.
I further merge bond pricing data with the Mergent Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD) to
eliminate all but senior, unsecured, corporate debenture or medium-term notes. Bonds with no rating
and with options-like features (callable, puttable, or convertible bonds or bonds with sinking funds) as
well as bonds with less than one year or more than 30 years to maturity are removed. This process
reduced the number of firms in the sample to 276.
Last, my sample is limited to firms that have at least one outstanding bond that has price infor-
mation available both before and after the onset of CDS trading (169 firms).17 I further restrict my
analysis to firms that had investment-grade credit ratings (no worse than BBB) at the time they ini-
tiated CDS trading. Table I presents descriptive statistics on the final sample, which totals 136 firms
and 1,506 firm-quarter observations from Q2 2001 to Q3 2008. Panels A and B break down the CDS
firms by industry and rating, respectively, at the time of CDS introduction. As expected, firms in the
manufacturing and financial industries (67 and 32, respectively) comprise the larger portion, and firms
with relatively lower ratings (i.e., A and BBB) constitute nearly 90% of the sample. Panel C breaks
down firms by the timing (i.e., year) of CDS introduction. CDS trading begins in 2001 for 34% of firms,
2002 for 29%, 2003 for 16%, and by the third quarter of 2008 for the remainder.18
B. Strategic Variables
In this section, I describe the way I construct the main variable in my analysis, the so-called strate-
gic variable (STRATVAR), which is used to differentiate firms with high and low incentives for strate-
gic default. For a given firm, the strategic variable is measured only once at the time of CDS intro-
14This filter might create a selection bias since some large firms may have already traded CDS traded before 2001. However,
2001 marks the period from which CDS have been widely used even though CDS have been traded since 1996.
15TRACE was established in 2002 by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), formerly NASD, to disseminate
secondary over-the-counter (OTC) corporate bonds transactions on behalf of members. TRACE first recorded bond transactions
on July 1, 2002. Today, it includes all trades in the secondary OTC markets for corporate bonds, save some small retail trades
on NYSE. TRACE includes, among other information, transaction dates and prices. A comprehensive description of the TRACE
database is given in Downing, Underwood, and Xing (2005).
16NAIC, an alternative to the no-longer available Lehman fixed income database on corporate bonds used in previous studies,
covers approximately 25-40% of total over-the-counter secondary corporate bond transactions by American life, health, property
and casualty insurance companies since 1994.
17For firms with multiple candidates of bond issues, I use one representative bond per firm to mitigate potential bias. Were
all available bonds per firm used in the analysis, the results might over-represent larger companies with large numbers of bond
issues, which could introduce bias inasmuch as my test focuses on credit spreads at the firm-, rather than trade- or bond-, level.
18My breakdown of firms is similar to that of Ashcraft and Santos (2009), who employ the same CDS database (Markit).
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duction. For each of three strategic variables employed, the number zero follows the variable name to
distinguish these time-invariant variables from other time-varying variables. Included in a regression
as a interaction term with the CDS trading indicator, these variables would play a role in sorting firms
into high and low strategic firms.
B.1. Shareholder Bargaining Power
As a measure of shareholders’ bargaining power, I use CEO shareholding defined as the proportion
of shares held by a CEO (CEOSHARE0).19 CEOs with a high stake in a company are likely to ag-
gressively represent equity holders in renegotiation, thus generating collective bargaining force more
effectively. This is evidenced by existing studies documenting that equity deviations from the absolute
priority rule (APR) in the bankruptcy process are more likely for firms with higher CEO ownership.
Betker (1995), for example, documents that a 10% increase in CEO shareholding increases equity
deviations from the APR in Chapter 11 by as much as 1.2% of firm value.
B.2. Liquidation Costs
I use asset intangibility (INTANGIBLE0) as a measure of liquidation costs. Debt holders should
be more willing to forgive debt in renegotiation if their alternative is to face high costs in liquidation.
Asset intangibility is computed as 1 minus the asset tangibility measure, which is the average of
the expected exit values per dollar of the different tangible assets in liquidation weighted by their
proportion of total book assets. Specifically, following Berger, Ofek, and Swary (1996) and Almeida
and Campello (2007), I compute asset tangibility as (0.715× Receivables + 0.547× Inventory + 0.535×
Capital + 1 × Cash Holdings), scaled by the total book value of assets. Subtracting this measure of
asset tangibility from1 yields the liquidation cost.20
B.3. Renegotiation Frictions
I use the dispersion of bond holders as a proxy for renegotiation frictions. Firms with a large
number of of bond holders have more difficulty restructuring their debt privately, resulting in for-
mal bankruptcies due to both the hold-out problem and conflicts of interest (Gertner and Scharfstein
(1991); Bolton and Scharfstein (1996); Bris, Welch, and Zhu (2006)). I use the number of bond issues
(ISSUENUM0) to capture the dispersion of bond holders. This measure is computed as the logarithm
19Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007), Valta (2008) and Nejadmalayeri and Singh (2011) also use CEO shareholding as a proxy
for shareholder bargaining power.
20This asset intangibility measure is also employed to measure liquidation cost in Garlappi, Shu, and Yan (2008), Valta (2008),
Favara, Schroth, and Valta (2012), and Zhang (2011).
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of the number of outstanding public bond issues divided by the logarithm of the book value of a firm’s
total debt (Gilson, John, and Lang (1990)).21
C. Risk, Information Transparency, and Liquidity
In this section, I describe how to construct three other variables, all of which are also time-invariant,
and included in a regression as an interaction with the CDS trading indicator. These variables serve as
a control to account for the endogeneity of strategic variables. Like strategic variables, these variables
are also measured only once, at the time of CDS introduction for a given firm. Credit rating (RATING0)
is used to reflect a firm’s riskiness, and information transparency is captured by analyst coverage, de-
fined as the number of equity analysts that forecast a firm’s earnings (ANALYSNUM0). Firms with
more analyst coverage are considered to be less informationally opaque either because analysts in-
crease the information available about them or because they extend coverage to more transparent
firms.22 Bond liquidity is measured using the log of the bond’s total number of trades (BTRDNUM0).
D. Bond Yield Spread and Control Variable
I now present the construction of dependent variables and other control variables that are known to
affect bond spreads. Note that unlike the strategic variables (and other variables that are used to ad-
dress the endogeneity of strategic variables) presented in the previous sections, these are time-varying
variables. The dependent variable is a bond’s yield spread (BSPREAD) computed as the difference
between its yield-to-maturity and the maturity-matched Treasury bond yield. I construct a complete
yield curve of Treasury bonds by linear interpolation from 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, and 30-year Treasury rates
using bond yields obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The bond spread control
variables include the followings:
1. MKTLEV: A market value-based definition of firm leverage is computed as the market value of
long-term debt divided by the book value of total assets.
2. FIRMSIZ: Market value-based firm size is defined as the logarithm of the book value of long-term
debt plus the market value of common equity.
3. STOCKVOL: The historic volatility of equity is measured in terms of the standard deviation of
daily stock prices over the past three months.
21The same measure of renegotiation friction is used in Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) and Nejadmalayeri and Singh
(2011).
22Bhushan (1989), Francis and Soffer (1997),Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000), Chang, Dasgupta, and Hilary (2006).
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4. RATING: An ordinal number is assigned to a firm’s S&P rating as follows: AAA = 1, AA+ = 2, AA
= 3, AA- = 4, A+ = 5, A = 6, A- = 7, BBB+ = 8, BBB = 9, BBB- = 10, BB+ = 11, BB = 12, BB- = 13,
B+ = 14, B = 15, and B- = 16.
5. BLIQ: Individual-level bond liquidity is measured by the logarithm of the bond’s total number of
trades in a quarter.
6. BMKTLIQ: Aggregate-level bond market liquidity is measured by the logarithm of total number
of trades for the universe of corporate bonds in a quarter.
E. Descriptive Statistics
To obtain the data necessary to compute these variables, my sample of CDS firms is further merged
with Compustat Quarterly for accounting and rating information, ExecuComp for managerial share-
holding data, and I/B/E/S for data on equity analysts’ earning forecasts. Table II presents the summary
statistics for these six variables. As shown in Panel A, the mean (median) is 0.58 (0.11), 0.59 (0.57),
and 0.23 (0.24), and the standard deviation 1.76, 0.13, and 0.11 for CEOSHARE0, INTANGIBLE0, and
ISSUENUM0, respectively. The median rating (RATING0) of CDS firms is 7 (i.e., A-) and the average
number of analysts 9 (ANALYSNUM0). The mean and standard deviation of BTRDNUM0 is 1.43 and
1.26, respectively. Panel B presents the correlation matrix for these six variables. That the variables
are not significantly related to one another suggests that each of variables captures a distinct aspect
of the firm.
Table III reports summary statistics on bond yield spreads and control variables described above.
Panels A and B show that a bond’s yield spreads monotonically increase with a firm’s credit rating
and a bond’s maturity. Panel C compares firms before and after the start of their CDS trade. It shows
that there is a reduction in stock volatility, deterioration in credit quality, increase in leverage and
firm size, improvement in bond liquidity at both individual and market level, and a slight decrease in
yield spreads. The results of lower yield spreads and higher leverage after the onset of CDS trading
are different from Ashcraft and Santos (2009), who find the opposite results. But, when controlling
for other credit factors in a regression, I also observe an increase in spreads. My result on leverage is
consistent with Saretto and Tookes (2013), who document that firms with traded CDS maintain higher
leverage ratios.
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F. Empirical Specification
I estimate the model below in Equation (11) using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with
both firm-fixed and time-fixed effects. I use within-firm rather than between-firm information to control
for potential omitted variables that would differ between firms. Within a firm, I compare the secondary
market prices of the same bond of the firm before and after the onset of CDS trading. To get around the
potential endogeneity in the firm’s bond issuance decisions, I employ market prices of the bond unlike
existing studies that use issuance prices.
BSPREADi,t = αi + β1 TRADINGi,t + β2 STRATV ARi
+ β3 TRADINGi,t × STRATV ARi
+
∑
j
γj CONTROL(j)i,t + δt TimeDummies+ εi,t, (11)
where αi is included to control for firm-fixed effects, and time dummy variables for time (i.e., quarter-
year) fixed effects. BSPREADi,t is bond spreads of firm i in quarter t, and TRADINGi,t is a dummy
variable that is equal to zero for firm-quarters before the onset of CDS trading, and 1 otherwise.
STRATV ARi is strategic variables measured in the quarter before the onset of CDS trading (i.e.,
CEOSHARE0i, INTANGIBLE0i, or ISSUENUM0i). I use lagged values (by one quarter) for the
controls to mitigate the potential endogeneity problem. All standard errors are clustered at the firm
level.
Note that STRATV ARi is a time-invariant variable while TRADINGi,t is a time-varying vari-
able.23 Specifically, the interaction term TRADINGi,t × STRATV ARi takes zero for all the quarters
of firm i before the start of CDS trading, and 1×(the value of firm i’s STRATV AR at the time of
CDS introduction) for all quarters after CDS trading. This setup would be similar to a difference-in-
differences framework with a continuous variable for the treatment/control indicator. In other words,
by interacting time-invariant strategic variables with the TRADING dummy, I am allowed to sort firms
before the onset of CDS trading into firms with high and low strategic incentives, and then examine
how these groups of firms behave differently with the introduction of CDS. In this regard, the coeffi-
cient β3 on the interaction term is my main interest, which captures the differential effects of CDS on
credit spreads across firms with different (i.e., high or low) strategic incentives.
23Hence the strategic variable, STRATV ARi is subsumed under the firm-fixed effect model.
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III. Empirical Findings
In this section, I present my main empirical findings on the impact of CDS trading on bond spreads.
I first examine the unconditional effect of CDS as a benchmark (with the TRADING variable alone
in the regression), followed by its conditional effect upon the firm’s strategic default incentives (with
both the TRADING variable and its interaction term with the strategic variable).
A. Unconditional Effects of CDS Trading
The estimated coefficients on the main variable, TRADING, along with coefficients on other con-
trols are presented in Table IV. The results are presented for four different model specifications accord-
ing to the selection of control variables. In Column (1), only variables of interest to me are included,
without any controls. Column (2) adds credit ratings (RATING) to control for the firm’s creditworthi-
ness.24 Firm-specific bond liquidity (BLIQ) and aggregate corporate bond market liquidity (BMKTLIQ)
are included in Column (3) to reflect the fact that corporate bond illiquidity accounts for a significant
part of bond spreads. Finally, in Column (4), firm size (FIRMSIZ), equity volatility (STOCKVOL), and
market leverage (MKTLEV) are further controlled.
Except for the model specification in Column (4), it is shown that the coefficients on TRADING on
credit spreads are positive and statistically significant at 10% level, with the magnitude of 23∼34 basis
points (bps). This implies that bond spreads increase with the introduction of CDS trading on average
for firms in my sample. Control variables are shown to have their expected signs. The nonlinear effect
of credit ratings is captured in the negative coefficient on RATING2, which is statistically significant.
Bond liquidity measures are negative and statistically significant both at the individual-bond and at
the aggregate market level. As expected, stock volatility is the most significant variable with the
positive sign whereas firm’s asset size and market leverage do not play a further significant role.
The positive coefficients on TRADING seem to be at odds with my first hypothesis H1, which
should predict the negative relation between CDS trading and bond spreads. This seemingly con-
tradictory result possibly arises due to the inability of the empirical model to identify the strategic
default channel of CDS per se, through which shareholder’s reduced incentives of strategic default are
reflected in bond spreads. In fact, there are other mechanisms through which CDS trading increases
bond spreads.25 If these channels are dominant, it would be difficult for the current empirical setting
24Credit ratings are controlled both in a linear and a quadratic term.
25For instance, Ashcraft and Santos (2009) empirically find a positive relationship, and they attribute this result to the pos-
sibility that creditors have fewer incentives to monitor debtors (i.e., the firm) once they are protected with CDS. It is also
theoretically proved that CDS may drive investors’ demands on credit exposures out of the bond market toward CDS markets.
As a result, the presence of CDS would result in higher bond spreads (see Che and Sethi (2016); Oehmke and Zawadowski
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to identify the strategic default channel, which is the main focus of my study. Therefore, in the next
section, I exploit the cross-sectional variation in a firm’s strategic incentives, which would yield the
unique predictions for the strategic channel I am interested in.
B. Conditional Effects of CDS Trading upon Strategic Incentives
Table V shows the estimated coefficients for the regression with a CEO shareholding (CEOSHARE0)
as a proxy for the firm’s strategic default incentive. As in the results of unconditional effects of CDS
in Table IV, the results are presented for four different model specifications. It is noticeable that while
coefficients on TRADING remain positive, coefficients on its interaction with a strategic variable
(TRADING× CEOSHARE0) are observed to be negative and statistically significant at the 1% level,
irrespective of model specifications. The negative coefficient on the interaction term indicates that
firms with high CEO ownership experience a larger reduction in their bond spreads after CDS trading
compared to firms with low CEO ownership. The magnitude of coefficient, which is sizable and fairly
stable across specifications, ranges from –8.5 to –9.9. This represents that a one-standard deviation
increase in CEOSHARE0 (1.76) translates into a decrease by 17 bps in average credit spreads.26
Table VI presents the results of the regression for asset intangibility (INTANGIBLE0) as a strategic
proxy. It is shown that coefficients on the interaction term are all negative regardless of specification,
which suggests that firms with a large portion of intangible assets experience a larger reduction in
bond spreads. Unlike the results in Table V, however, the coefficient varies with model specifications
in both statistical significance and magnitude. It is not very significant for the specification in Column
(1), and becomes significant when a larger number of variables is controlled for. The magnitude tends
to be bigger (in an absolute term) with the large number of controls, ranging from –62.7 in Column (1)
to –182.2 in Column (4). This may suggest that asset intangibility would be a noisier proxy and more
endogenous than equity ownership. In comparison with the results for CEOSHARE0, an one-standard
deviation increase in the ratio of intangible to total assets (0.13) is associated with a reduction of 24
bps in average bond spreads.
The results of the regression with ISSUENUM0 are presented in Table VII. In contrast to the
other two variables, coefficients on the interaction term are positive, which is highly significant and
robust to different model specifications. The magnitude, ranging from 149.2 to 174.3 tends to become
smaller once more variables are controlled for. This result indicates that the decrease (not increase,
as in the case of former variables) in the number of bond issues results in a larger reduction in credit
(2015)).
26The estimated coefficient in Column (4) is used for this calculation.
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spreads. The economic impact, though, is similar to that of the other two variables, and a one-standard
deviation decrease in the normalized number of bond issues (0.11) translates into a reduction of 15 bps
in average bond spreads.
To summarize, these results are in line with my second hypothesis H2 that firms with higher strate-
gic incentives benefit more from the introduction of CDS. To interpret estimated coefficients more
clearly, in Figure 4 I plot the (model-estimated) changes in bond spreads as a function of the strate-
gic variable in my sample.27 There is one figure for each strategic variable (CEOSHARE0 in the top,
INTANGIBLE0 in the middle, ISSUENUM0 in the bottom panel). The curved line represents the
cross-sectional Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of each variable. The solid (dotted) straight
line represents the spread reductions following the onset of CDS trading. The graph reveals that
firms with highest (lowest) value for CEOSHARE0 and INTANGIBLE0 (ISSUENUM0) experience a
reduction in spreads while the remainder of the firms experience an increase in spreads.
C. The CDS Effect and Firm Riskiness
In this section, I examine how a firm’s riskiness relates to the CDS effect presented in the previous
sections. More specifically, I aim to investigate whether the relation between bond spreads and strate-
gic variables would be more pronounced among the group of firms with high risk (or, low creditworthi-
ness). I tackle this question from two different approaches: First, I do a subsample analysis by running
the same regression in Equation (11) separately for each of two subgroups of firms, namely, those rated
A- and higher, and those rated BBB+ or lower.28 Second, I do a dummy variable analysis by including
in the regression the dummy, HIGHRISK which is equal to 1 if the rating is BBB+ or lower, and zero
otherwise. This dummy variable is then multiplied by each of three strategic variables and the trading
dummy to construct the triple interaction term, i.e., TRADINGi,t × STRATV ARi ×HIGHRISKi.
The results for the subgroup analysis are presented in Panel A of Table VIII.29 It is shown that
coefficients on TRADING×STRATV AR tend to be more statistically significant for the group of high
risk firms. Moreover, the magnitude of coefficients is observed to be bigger for the sample of high-risk
firms. For instance, the coefficient on the interaction term with CEOSHARE0 (–11.3) suggests that
a one-standard deviation increase in CEOSHARE0 for the high-risk firms (2.43) is associated with a
reduction of 27 bps. For the group of low-risk firms, the coefficient (–6.4) indicates that a one-standard
27The graphs are drawn only based on two estimated coefficients in specification (4), TRADING and TRADING ×
STRATV AR from Table V for CEOSHARE0, Table VI for INTANGIBLE0, and Table VII for ISSUENUM0.
28I divide firms in this way in order to have a similar number of firms in each group (A- is the median credit rating of the firms
in my sample).
29To conserve space, I report only the coefficients on the variables of main interest to me for the specifications in Column (4)
in Table from Table V to Table VII.
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deviation increase (1.02) is associated with a 6.1 bps reduction. This pattern is similarly shown in
the regression with a dummy variable for the whole sample, whose results are reported in Panel B of
Table VIII. The coefficient on TRADING×STRATV AR×HIGHRISK is negative for CEOSHARE0
and INTANGIBLE0, but positive for ISSUENUM0. These results would imply that the conditional
effect of CDS trading upon the strategic variable is more pronounced for the group of riskier firms.
IV. Robustness
A. Subsample of Firms with Low CDS Amount Outstanding
The reasoning of my study depends crucially on the assumption that creditors of the firm become
empty creditors after the onset of CDS trading. This assumption would not be the case if the majority
of CDS trading consisted of “naked CDS,” i.e., buyers of CDS are not creditors of the firm. To mitigate
this concern, I consider a subsample of firms that have a reasonably low ratio of CDS notional to the
total amount of debt outstanding. The basic idea is that I want to focus on firms whose CDS contracts
traded in the market are likely to be purchased by their creditors, rather than speculators who would
buy the CDS without holding the firm’s bond.30 In doing so, I construct a dummy variable, LOWCDS,
which is equal to1 if the firm’s ratio of CDS to debt is low (i.e., lower than 0.7) on average during my
sample period, and zero if the ratio is high (i.e., higher than 0.7).31 In Table IX, the coefficients on the
triple interaction term between TRADING×STRATV AR and LOWCDS are observed to be negative
for CEOSHARE0 and INTANGIBLE0, but positive for ISSUENUM0. This may suggest that my
earlier findings are less likely to be contaminated by the possibility of most CDS trading being naked.
B. Alternative Empirical Methodologies
So far I have shown that a firms’ (especially firms with high strategic incentives) average bond
spreads would be reduced after the introduction of CDS. In this section, I investigate when and how
a decrease in bond spread changes would take place after the onset of CDS trading. I address this
question by employing two additional empirical frameworks: one is a cross-sectional event study, and
30I acknowledge that the low CDS subsample still cannot fully address the naked CDS issue because it is still impossible to
distinguish between hedging purpose and speculation purpose of CDS purchase from the outstanding amount of CDS. This can
be done only with the investor-level data for the CDS positions, which are not accessible. Alternatively, the trading volume of
CDS might be useful for this purpose because the more naked traders that exist, the more trading is likely to occur, but I do not
have access to these data either.
31The ratio of CDS to total debt amount being high or low is based on the median ratio (0.7) for the sample of firms studied in
Subrahmanyam et al. (2014). Based on this criterion, about 20% of firms in my sample are identified as having a low amount of
CDS relative to their total debt on average during my sample period. I thank the authors for providing me with the data on the
list of firms whose average ratio of CDS to debt is reasonably low during the period 2001-2008.
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the other a difference-in-differences framework with the indicator (not continuous as before) variable
for treatment and control groups.
For an event study, I consider two specific points in time, (–2, 8), i.e., two quarters before and eight
quarters afterwards.32 Abnormal bond spreads are computed for each time point for a given bond that
has data available for both time points.33 In Figure 5, I plot the median abnormal spread for high and
low strategic firms separately, the solid line indicating high strategic variable, and the dashed line low
strategic variable. I note that abnormal bond spreads tend to decrease, especially for firms with high
CEOSHARE0 and INTANGIBLE0, and low ISSUENUM0. This pattern is similarly shown in the
regression setting, Table X, for which I regress the (abnormal) spread change between two time points
(i.e., two quarters before and eight quarters after the onset of CDS trading) on each strategic variable.
For a difference-in-differences framework, I group firms based on STRATV AR into high (i.e., above
the sample median value) and low (i.e., below the sample median value) groups using the sample me-
dian value, and create a dummy variable, STRATV AR_TREAT , which is equal to 1 if STRATV AR
is high, and zero if STRATV AR is low. The intuition is that high strategic firms are considered
as if they are “treated” whereas low strategic firms would serve as the control groups in a regres-
sion. With this treatment/control indicator with respect to high strategic default incentives, I run
the standard difference-in-differences type regression with time-fixed effects, and report the results
in Table XI, in which all standard errors are clustered at the group (i.e., treatment or control) level.
Coefficients on the interaction terms between CDS trading and the strategic treatment dummy (i.e.,
CEOSHARE_TREAT , INTANGIBLE_TREAT , or ISSUENUM_TREAT ) are all shown to have the
expected signs.
C. Accounting for the Endogeneity of Strategic Variables
Since my strategic variables are not totally random, they could pick up other characteristics of
the firm than strategic default intentives of shareholders, per se. In this case, there may be concern
that the main results of my study, i.e., the conditional effect of CDS upon strategic proxies, could be
spurious. In this section, I aim to mitigate this concern by examining whether my results are robust
to controlling for other firm characteristics at the time of CDS introduction. I consider three different
firm characteristics, which have been studied in the literature as relevant to the relation between CDS
trading and bond spreads.
First, I consider the firm’s riskiness and informational transparency. It is empirically shown (e.g.,
32I consider two years’ time as the post-CDS trading period following the existing literature, e.g., Subrahmanyam et al. (2014).
33Since my sample is an unbalanced panel, this restriction reduces my sample size significantly to 25 firms.
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Ashcraft and Santos (2009)) that safe (or informationally transparent) firms benefit more than risky
(or informationally opaque) firms in terms of the reduction of bond spreads after the inception of CDS
trading. If my strategic proxies happen to capture these characteristics, it would be difficult to argue
that my findings point to the existence of a strategic default channel.34 The next candidate is a bond’s
liquidity. It is theoretically documented (e.g., Oehmke and Zawadowski (2015)) that the effects of
CDS on bond spreads would depend on the liquidity of underlying bonds. The authors argue that
illiquid bonds would benefit more than liquid bonds from the traded CDS. Therefore, I control for
bond liquidity as well as credit ratings and analyst coverage (as a proxy for risk and information
transparency, respectively).
I control for each of three firm characteristics in a regression in the form of its interaction with the
CDS trading dummy in the otherwise identical empirical model in Equation 11. This new interaction
term essentially allows me to double-sort firms at the time of CDS introduction based on strategic
variables and the controlling characteristic. In other words, I can exploit the variation of strategic
variables while keeping other firm characteristics constant. The regression results are reported in
Table XII, in which four different specifications are examined for each strategic variable: firm risk,
information transparency, and bond liquidity are controlled individually in Columns (1), (2), and (3),
respectively, and all three together in Column (4). Coefficients on TRADING × STRATV AR remain
highly significant even when these alternative characteristics are controlled for, which suggests that
my results are less likely to be contaminated by the endogeneity problem with my strategic variable.
Regardless of the empirical specification adopted, the interaction term TRADING × RATING0
is shown to be notably positive for Table XII. This result is consistent with the existing evidence in
Ashcraft and Santos (2009), which documents that safe firms (i.e., firms with the smaller number for
RATING0) benefit whereas risky firms (i.e., firms with the larger number forRATING0) are penalized
by CDS trading.
D. Endogeneity of CDS Trading
Another potential concern is the possibility that the onset of CDS trading is endogenously deter-
mined. To mitigate the potential impact of endogeneity, I perform a matched sample analysis as fol-
lows.35 I first construct a sample of non-CDS firms closely matched to my CDS firms based on several
34This is, however, unlikely to be the case because Panel C in Table II shows that there is little correlation between any of
three strategic variables, and the proxy for firm risk or information transparency.
35The matching technique was first developed in the statistics literature (e.g., Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)) and has been
widely applied in the finance and economics literatures. Mayhew and Mihov (2004), for example, in their study of the selection of
stocks for option listing, match stocks that are not selected for option listing with listed stocks, and Ashcraft and Santos (2009)
and Saretto and Tookes (2013) match non-CDS firms to CDS firms based on various firm characteristics.
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dimensions of firm characteristics likely to predict CDS trading. I then use this sample in the analysis
as a control group. My basic assumption is that, conditional on the matching, the timing of the onset
of CDS trading can become somewhat random. The detailed matching procedure is explained below.
Following Mayhew and Mihov (2004) and Ashcraft and Santos (2009), I estimate the ex-ante proba-
bility of the onset of CDS trading for a given firm using a probit model in which the dependent variable
is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if CDS begins to trade in the current quarter and zero other-
wise.36 Explanatory variables include firm characteristics considered likely to predict CDS trading.37
I then choose for each quarter non-CDS firms that match CDS firms as closely as possible in terms
of the estimated probability of CDS trading. Last, provided they have bond information available, I
assign to each matched firm a counterfactual date (i.e., quarter) for the onset of CDS trading.
The probit regression results are reported in Panel A of Table XIII. Consistent with Oehmke and
Zawadowski (2014), it is shown that CDS trading is more likely for firms with lower ratings, firms with
higher equity volatility, and firms with lower dispersion of analysts’ earning forecasts.38 I use these
estimated coefficients to compute the propensity scores and select firms that have not traded CDS but
are closely matched to traded firms in terms of their scores. By means of this procedure I identify 55
matched firms from the sample of non-CDS firms. Panel B presents the descriptive statistics of both
traded and matched samples.
For the combined sample of both traded and matched firms (i.e., a total of 191 firms), I re-estimate
the regression model in Equation (11) and report the results. As shown in Table XIV, the coefficients
on the three renegotiation proxies remain statistically significant for most cases, even after adding the
matched firms to my original sample.
E. Alternative Strategic Proxies
An alternative way to get around the endogeneity problem with my strategic variable would be
to employ different variables to proxy for a firm’s incentive of strategic default, and see whether the
results are robust. Since it is difficult to find a perfect proxy for bargaining power, and the literature
does not identify a definite proxy for it, I follow Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) and use CEO’s
tenure with the firm as an additional proxy. When the CEO is entrenched and has high firm-specific
human capital, measured by longer tenure, the CEO may be in a better position to bargain on behalf
of shareholders. I employ the ratio of nonfixed assets and the proportion of short-term debt to proxy for
36I record only the first quarter of CDS trading, after which the firm-quarters of a firm are dropped from the sample.
37I include as covariates equity volatility, profitability, firm size, credit rating, leverage, industry, and dispersion of analysts’
earnings forecast, all of which are lagged by one quarter to ensure that no outcome variable is included as a regressor.
38It is worth noting that this estimation exercise is not intended for making any causal inferences about CDS trading. My
goal is to project relevant firm characteristics on the probability of CDS trading and use them as the matching dimension.
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liquidation costs and renegotiation frictions, respectively. In unreported tables, they show the similar
patterns to the original variables.39
V. Conclusion
In this paper, I provide a theoretical and empirical analysis of ex-ante commitment benefits of
CDS, i.e., the benefit of CDS reducing the firm’s incentives for strategic default on its debt. First,
I develop a theoretical framework by extending a stylized model of strategic debt service with debt
renegotiation, which allows me to relate the changes in a bond’s yield spreads due to the presence of
CDS-protected debt holders (so-called empty creditors) to (1) shareholder bargaining advantages in
renegotiation and (2) renegotiation frictions. I use two variables to capture shareholder advantages,
namely the concentration of equity ownership (proxied by CEO shareholding) and the firm’s liquidation
costs (proxied by asset intangibility). The dispersion of bond holders (proxied by the number of public
bond issues) is used to reflect renegotiation frictions that the firm faces.
To test my predictions, I employ the secondary market prices of corporate bonds of U.S. investment-
grade firms that initiated CDS trading betwen 2001 and 2008, and compare a bond’s yield spreads
between pre- and post-CDS trading. My analysis shows that while an average firm experiences a
slight increase in spreads following the onset of CDS trading, firms whose creditors would have been
highly vulnerable to shareholders’ strategic defaults in the absence of CDS experienced a relative large
reduction in spreads. In particular, the greater benefit accrues to those firms with high shareholder
bargaining power and firms with fewer renegotiation frictions. Furthermore, these relations are more
pronounced among riskier firms that have more chance of undergoing debt renegotiation in the near
future.
This paper provides the first empirical evidence of the beneficial role of CDS and empty creditors
through their impact on shareholders’ incentives for strategic default. Much of the news media and
existing law literature has focused on the negative impact of these and hence, how to regulate the CDS
markets accordingly. For instance, legal scholars propose removing the voting rights of empty creditors
in the debt restructuring process. My results imply that it would also erode their commitment benefits.
More broadly, my findings support the novel view of the economic role of CDS markets as commitment
devices: by giving more credibility to borrowers’ commitment to repay debt, CDS could contribute to a
reduction in the (inefficient) cost of corporate debt.
39Tables are available from the author on request.
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Figure 1. Growth of the CDS Markets
This figure displays the notional amount of outstanding CDS contracts in trillion dollars from 2001 to 2008, source: BIS.
Figure 2. Number of Firms with CDS Trading
This figure displays the number of firms with outstanding CDS contracts from 2001 to 2008, source: Markit.
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Figure 3. Comparative Static Analysis of Bond Spreads with respect to pi, η, α, q
This figure plots the impact of CDS trading on bond spreads across different pi, η, α, and q. Panel (a) shows the relationship
between the amount of CDS (pi) and bond spreads. In panel (b), (c), and (d), the 3-D graph plots the bond spread on the z-axis,
the CDS amount (pi) on the x-axis, and the equity holder’s bargaining power (η), a firm’s liquidation costs (α), debt renegotiation
frictions (q), respectively on the y-axis.
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Figure 4. Bond Spread Changes and Strategic Variables at the time of CDS Introduction
This figure plots the impact of CDS trading across firm characteritics (CEO shareholding in the top panel, asset intangibility in
the middle panel, and bondholder dispersion in the bottom panel) an on bond spreads. The dashed curved line (for the y-axis on
the left) illustrates the cross-sectional CDF (Cumulative Distribution Function) of a firm characteristic measured in the quarter
before the onset of CDS trading. The dotted straight line (for the y-axis on the right) plots the changes in average bond spreads
after the onset of CDS trading.
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Figure 5. Abnormal Bond Spreads Before and After the CDS Trading for High vs. Low Strategic
Variables
This figure provides the plots of abnormal bond spreads two quarters before, and eight quarters after the onset of CDS trading.
For each period, the median values of the spreads are plotted for firms with high strategic variables for the solid line, and firms
with low strategic value for the dashed line.
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Table I: The Breakdown of the Number of Firms
This table reports descriptive statistics on the final sample of CDS firms used in my main analysis (i.e., firms that initiated CDS
trading during the period 2001-2008). Panels A, B, and C present a breakdown of the number of firms by industry, rating, and
year of onset of CDS trading, respectively. For each panel, number and percentage of firms are reported in the column of Freq.
and Perc., respectively. The cumulative number and percentage of firms are reported in the columns of Cum. Freq. and Cum.
Perc.. The industry to which a firm belongs and its ratings are measured during the quarter its CDS trading begins. The onset
of CDS trading is assumed to occur on the first date a U.S.-dollar-dominated CDS contract is traded at a five-year maturity.
PANEL A: Number of Firms by Industry
Industry Freq. Perc. Cum. Freq. Cum. Perc.
Agriculture, Mining, and Construction 10 7.94 10 7.35
Manufacturing 67 49.27 77 56.62
Transportation, Communications, and Utilities 12 8.82 89 65.44
Wholesale and Retail Trades 10 7.35 89 72.79
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 32 23.53 131 96.32
Services and Public Administration 5 1.47 136 100.00
PANEL B: Number of Firms by Rating
Rating Freq. Perc. Cum. Freq. Cum. Perc.
AAA 3 2.21 3 2.21
AA 11 8.1 14 10.19
A 60 44.11 74 54.41
BBB 62 45.59 136 100.00
PANEL C: Number of Firms by Year of Onset of CDS Trading
Year Freq. Perc. Cum. Freq. Cum. Perc.
2001 47 34.56 47 34.56
2002 40 29.41 87 63.97
2003 23 16.91 110 80.88
2004 11 8.09 121 88.97
2005 7 5.15 128 94.12
2006 2 1.47 130 95.59
2007 5 3.68 135 99.26
2008 1 0.74 136 100.00
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Table II: Firm-Specific Variables at the Time of the Onset of CDS Trading
This table reports summary statistics on firm-specific variables at the time of the onset of CDS trading. Panel A gives the
summary statistic. CEOSHARE0 is the proportion (in percentage) of shares held by a CEO, INTANGIBLE0 is the ratio of
intangible to total assets, defined as 0.715 × Receivables + 0.547 × Inventory + 0.535 × Capital + 1 × Cash Holdings, and
ISSUENUM0 is the logarithm of the number of outstanding public bond issues divided by the logarithm of the book value (in
billions) of the firm’s total debt. RATING0 is the ordinal S&P rating and is given by the following transformation: AAA=1,
AA+=2, AA=3, AA-=4, A+=5, A=6, A-=7, BBB+=8, BBB=9, BBB=10. ANALY SNUM0 is the number of equity analysts that
forecast a firm’s earnings. BTRDNUM0 is the logarithm of the total number of the bond’s trades in a quarter. All variables are
measured during the quarter of the onset of CDS trading. Panel C presents the correlation matrix between strategic, hedging,
and information variables. The p-values are reported in parentheses (***,**, and * stand for significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels using a two-tailed test).
PANEL A: Summary Statistics
N Mean Median Min Max Std. Dev.
CEOSHARE0 125 0.58 0.11 0 12.54 1.76
INTANGIBLE0 125 0.59 0.57 0.32 0.96 0.13
ISSUENUM0 133 0.23 0.24 0 0.56 0.11
RATING0 136 7.02 7.00 1 10 2.09
ANALYSNUM0 121 9 10.1 1 28 6.5
BTRDNUM0 136 1.43 1.09 0 6.81 1.26
PANEL B: Correlation Matrix
CEOSHARE0 INTANGIBLE0 ISSUENUM0 RATING0 ANALYSNUM0 BTRDNUM0
CEOSHARE0 1
INTANGIBLE0 0.03 1
ISSUENUM0 0.09 -0.07 1
RATING0 0.16* -0.10 0.00 1
ANLYSNUM0 -0.19** -0.09 -0.10 -0.14 1
BTRDNUM0 0.04 0.03 -0.13 -0.03 0.10 1
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of yield spreads (in bps) by credit rating and time to maturity, respectively. Panel C reports the summary statistics on control
variables as well as credit spreads before and after the onset of CDS trading. Leverage is long-term debt divided by market
value of total assets, Size equals the logarithm of long-term debt plus the market value of common equity, Stock Volatility is
the standard deviation of daily equity returns for the past three months, Rating is the ordinal S&P rating and is given by
the following transformation: AAA=1, AA+=2, AA=3, AA-=4, A+=5, A=6, A-=7, BBB+=8, BBB=9, BBB-=10, BB+=11, BB=12,
BB-=13, B+=14, B=15, B-=16, Profitability is earnings before tax and depreciation divided by total assets, and Maturity is the
remaining time in years to maturity date.
PANEL A: Bond Spread by Rating
Rating Obs Mean Median Std. Dev.
AAA 37 80.1 65.7 47.5
AA 92 152.6 108.8 109.1
A 663 156.7 120.0 122.9
BBB 669 232.5 178.7 180.7
BB 42 343.1 282.4 204.4
B 7 353.1 270.3 210.9
ALL 1,513 195.5 149.1 162.1
PANEL B: Bond Spread by Maturity
Maturity Obs Mean Median Std. Dev.
Short (< 3 years) 573 190.5 107.0 194.4
Medium (3-10 years) 689 197.1 163.7 137.8
Large (>10 years) 251 202.3 167.6 141.2
ALL 1,513 195.5 149.1 162.1
PANEL C: Variables Before and After the Onset of CDS Trading
All Before After
Obs Mean Std Dev Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std Dev
BSPREAD 1,513 195.47 162.06 494 199.76 125.44 1,019 193.39 177.14
TRADING 1,513 0.67 0.46 494 0.00 0.00 1,019 1.00 0.00
MKTLEV 1,502 0.23 0.19 489 0.21 0.15 1,013 0.24 0.20
FIRMSIZ 1,502 9.25 1.22 489 9.00 1.30 1,013 9.37 1.16
STOCKVOL 1,480 0.30 0.17 489 0.30 0.12 991 0.29 0.19
RATING 1,513 7.17 2.16 494 6.73 2.14 1,019 7.38 2.14
BLIQ 1,461 2.18 1.60 442 1.67 1.43 1,019 2.40 1.62
BMKTLIQ 1,513 118.20 37.77 494 100.78 32.24 1,019 126.40 37.38
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Table IV: Benchmark Regression: Unconditional Effects of CDS
This table reports the estimated coefficients of the regression model:
BSPRDi,t = αi + β1 TRADINGi,t +
∑
j
γj CONTROL(j)i,t + δt T imeDummies+ εi,t,
where αi denotes the firm fixed effects, BSPRDi,t is the bond spread of firm i in quarter t, TRADINGi,t is equal to zero for
the firm-quarters before the onset of CDS trading, and one otherwise. CONTROLi,t is the well-known determinant of bond
spreads including credit rating (RATING), bond liquidity at an individual-level (BLIQ) and a market-level (BMKTLIQ), firm
size (FIRMSIZ), stock volatility (STOCKV OL), and market leverage (MKTLEV ). Both firm-fixed effects and time-fixed
effects are included for all model specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, and the robust t-statistics are
given in brackets (***,**, and * stand for significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using a two-tailed test).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TRADING 34.3** 30.5** 31.9** 23.6
[2.17] [2.06] [2.11] [1.65]
RATING -8.8 -6.5 2.2
[-0.62] [-0.44] [0.17]
RATING2 2.3** 2.2** 1.6*
[2.32] [2.18] [1.56]
BLIQ -10.2* -7.1*
[-1.91] [-1.74]
BMKTLIQ -6.5*** -3.1*
[-5.33] [-1.79]
FIRMSIZ -14.3
[-0.73]
STOCKVOL 214.4***
[4.49]
MKTLEV 112.5
[1.17]
Firm-Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Firms 136 136 136 136
Number of Observations 1,513 1,513 1,461 1,424
R2 0.37 0.41 0.43 0.46
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This table reports the estimated coefficients of the regression model:
BSPRDi,t = αi + β1 TRADINGi,t + β2 CEOSHARE0i + β3 TRADINGi,t × CEOSHARE0i
+
∑
j
γj CONTROL(j)i,t + δt T imeDummies+ εi,t,
where αi denotes the firm fixed effects, BSPRDi,t is the bond spread of firm i in quarter t, TRADINGi,t is equal to zero for
the firm-quarters before the onset of CDS trading, and one otherwise. CEOSHARE0i is the proportion of shares held by a CEO
in the quarter before the onset of CDS trading. CONTROLi,t is the well-known determinant of bond spreads including credit
rating (RATING), bond liquidity at an individual-level (BLIQ) and a market-level (BMKTLIQ), firm size (FIRMSIZ), stock
volatility (STOCKV OL), and market leverage (MKTLEV ). Both firm-fixed effects and time-fixed effects are included for all
model specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, and the robust t-statistics are given in brackets (***,**,
and * stand for significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using a two-tailed test).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TRADING× CEOSHARE0 -8.5*** -9.0*** -9.9*** -9.9***
[-2.75] [-2.87] [-4.05] [-4.27]
TRADING 51.0*** 47.0*** 48.2*** 41.5***
[2.86] [2.87] [2.90] [2.64]
RATING -7.8 -5.6 1.2
[-0.55] [-0.39] [0.08]
RATING2 2.2** 2.1* 1.7*
[2.32] [2.18] [1.67]
BLIQ -11.4* -8.2*
[-1.91] [-1.82]
BMKTLIQ -6.1*** -2.5
[-4.78] [-1.36]
FIRMSIZ -27.5
[-1.31]
STOCKVOL 220.8***
[4.57]
MKTLEV 37.4
[0.36]
Firm-Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Firms 115 115 115 115
Number of Observations 1,322 1,322 1,279 1,246
R2 0.38 0.41 0.43 0.46
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This table reports the estimated coefficients of the regression model:
BSPRDi,t = αi + β1 TRADINGi,t + β2 INTANGIBLE0i + β3 TRADINGi,t × INTANGIBLE0i
+
∑
j
γj CONTROL(j)i,t + δt T imeDummies+ εi,t,
where αi denotes the firm fixed effects, BSPRDi,t is the bond spread of firm i in quarter t, TRADINGi,t is equal to zero for
the firm-quarters before the onset of CDS trading, and one otherwise. INTANGIBLE0i is the ratio of intangible to total assets
in the quarter before the onset of CDS trading. CONTROLi,t is the well-known determinant of bond spreads including credit
rating (RATING), bond liquidity at an individual-level (BLIQ) and a market-level (BMKTLIQ), firm size (FIRMSIZ), stock
volatility (STOCKV OL), and market leverage (MKTLEV ). Both firm-fixed effects and time-fixed effects are included for all
model specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, and the robust t-statistics are given in brackets (***,**,
and * stand for significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using a two-tailed test).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TRADING× INTANGIBLE0 -62.7 -119.0* -158.2*** -182.2***
[-0.87] [-1.90] [-2.62] [-3.34]
TRADING 68.9 97.6** 124.1*** 130.5***
[1.53] [2.44] [3.21] [3.32]
RATING -3.8 -1.9 6.2
[-0.28] [-0.14] [0.46]
RATING2 2.1** 2.1** 1.4
[2.10] [2.03] [1.39]
BLIQ -12.0** -3.5**
[-2.08] [-2.04]
BMKTLIQ -6.6*** -3.5**
[-5.48] [-2.04]
FIRMSIZ -22.9
[-1.07]
STOCKVOL 212.6***
[4.04]
MKTLEV 91.2
[0.88]
Firm-Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Firms 125 125 125 125
Number of Observations 1,411 1,411 1,364 1,331
R2 0.34 0.38 0.4 0.43
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This table reports the estimated coefficients of the main regression model:
BSPRDi,t = αi + β1 TRADINGi,t + β2 ISSUENUM0i + β3 TRADINGi,t × ISSUENUM0i
+
∑
j
γj CONTROL(j)i,t + δt T imeDummies+ εi,t,
where αi denotes the firm fixed effects, BSPRDi,t is the bond spread of firm i in quarter t, TRADINGi,t is equal to zero for
the firm-quarters before the onset of CDS trading, and one otherwise. ISSUENUM0i is the normalized number of outstanding
public bond issues (i.e. log(the number of bonds)/log(total debt) in the quarter before the onset of CDS trading). CONTROLi,t
is the well-known determinant of bond spreads including credit rating (RATING), bond liquidity at an individual-level (BLIQ)
and a market-level (BMKTLIQ), firm size (FIRMSIZ), stock volatility (STOCKV OL), and market leverage (MKTLEV ).
Both firm-fixed effects and time-fixed effects are included for all model specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the firm
level, and the robust t-statistics are given in brackets (***,**, and * stand for significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using a
two-tailed test).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TRADING× ISSUENUM0 174.3** 153.2** 156.7** 149.2*
[2.29] [2.07] [1.91] [1.85]
TRADING -4.1 -3.2 -0.5 -7.2
[-0.21] [-0.16] [-0.02] [-0.33]
RATING -9.4 -8 0.8
[-0.66] [-0.54] [0.06]
RATING2 2.3** 2.3** 1.6
[2.32] [2.23] [1.61]
BLIQ -9.8** -6.8
[-1.82] [-1.64]
BMKTLIQ -6.5*** -3.1*
[-5.34] [-1.78]
FIRMSIZ -13.9
[-0.72]
STOCKVOL 214.4***
[4.45]
MKTLEV 115.1
[1.19]
Firm-Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Firms 133 133 133 133
Number of Observations 1,501 1,501 1,450 1,413
R2 0.38 0.41 0.43 0.46
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Table VIII: The CDS Effect and Firm Riskiness
Panel A of this table reports the estimated coefficients on the interaction terms of TRADING with each of three proxies
for shareholder’s incentives of strategic default, namely CEOSHARE0, INTANGIBLE0, and ISSUENUM0. The same
regression model is estimated in Column (4) of Table V through Table VII. The results are presented separately for two subgroups
of firms based on their risk measured in the quarter before the onset of CDS trading, namely those rated BBB+ or lower (High
Risk Firms) in Column (1) to (3), and those rated A- and higher (Low Risk Firms) in Column (4) to (6). Panel B presents
the estimated coefficients for the triple interaction term between TRADING, STRATV AR, and HIGHRISK. HIGHRISK
is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if firms belong to the group of high risk firm, and zero otherwise. In both panels,
the control variable is the well-known determinant of bond spreads including credit rating (RATING), bond liquidity at an
individual-level (BLIQ) and a market-level (BMKTLIQ), firm size (FIRMSIZ), stock volatility (STOCKV OL), and market
leverage (MKTLEV ). Both firm-fixed effects and time-fixed effects are included for all model specifications. Standard errors
are clustered at the firm level, and the robust t-statistics are given in brackets (***,**, and * stand for significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels using a two-tailed test).
PANEL A: Subgroup Analysis
High Risk Firms Low Risk Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TRADING×CEOSHARE0 -11.3*** -6.4
[-3.76] [-0.64]
TRADING×INTANGIBLE0 -385.7*** -165.3***
[-4.37] [-3.27]
TRADING×ISSUENUM0 188.9 22.6
[1.48] [0.20]
TRADING 74.8** 103.0 -5.5 28.4* 126.3*** 19.2
[2.59] [1.06] [-0.18] [1.71] [3.50] [0.67]
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Firms 47 34 61 68 70 72
Number of Observations 490 424 615 756 765 798
R2 0.54 0.52 0.5 0.45 0.46 0.46
PANEL B: Dummy Variable Analysis
CEOSHARE0 INTANGIBLE0 ISSUENUM0
TRADING×STRATVAR*HIGHRISK -14.8 -110.4 167.3
[-1.37] [-0.98] [0.97]
TRADING×STRATVAR 0.80 -136.6** 87.0
[0.08] [-2.36] [0.80]
TRADING×HIGHRISK 52.4** 63.2 -16.4
[2.06] [0.87] [-0.39]
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Time-Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Number of Firms 86 90 94
Number of Observations 1,086 1,107 1,177
R2 0.5 0.47 0.49
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Table IX: Firms with Low CDS Amounts Outstanding
This table reports the estimated coefficients on the triple interaction terms between TRADING, STRATV AR, and a dummy
variable, LOWCDS, which is equal to one if the firm belongs to the sub-group of sample whose ratio of notional CDS amount
to the total debt outstanding is low (i.e., less than 0.7) on average for the period of 2001 to 2008, and zero otherwise. The
strategic variable, STRATV AR, includes each of three proxies for shareholder’s incentives of strategic default, CEOSHARE0,
INTANGIBLE0, and ISSUENUM0 in the quarter before the onset of CDS trading. The control variable is the well-known
determinant of bond spreads including credit rating (RATING), bond liquidity at an individual-level (BLIQ) and a market-
level (BMKTLIQ), firm size (FIRMSIZ), stock volatility (STOCKV OL), and market leverage (MKTLEV ). Both firm-fixed
effects and time-fixed effects are included for all model specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, and the
robust t-statistics are given in brackets (***,**, and * stand for significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using a two-tailed
test).
CEOSHARE0 INTANGIBLE0 ISSUENUM0
TRADING×STRATVAR×LOWCDS -10.1* -6.6 368.6**
[-1.72] [-0.06] [2.42]
TRADING×STRATVAR -10.3*** -270.0*** 114.1
[-6.35] [-4.94] [1.36]
TRADING×LOWCDS -20.4 -32.2 -95.9***
[-1.01] [-0.49] [-2.80]
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Time-Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Number of Firms 86 90 94
Number of Observations 1,086 1,107 1,177
R2 0.50 0.47 0.50
Table X: The Changes in Bond Spreads and Strategic Variables
This table reports the estimated coefficients on each of three strategic variables (CEOSHARE0, INTANGIBLE0, and
ISSUENUM0) along with two other control variables, the changes in ratings (∆RATING) and changes in bond liquidity,
∆BLIQ. Dependent variable is the change in bond spreads in Column (1) to (3), and the changes in abnormal bond spreads in
Column (4) to (6). All change variables are measured between two points in time: two quarters before- and eight quarters after
the onset of CDS trading. RATING is a numerical value assigned for the S&P’s credit ratings and BLIQ is measured as the
logarithm of the total number of the bond’s trades in a quarter. The t-statistics are given in brackets (***,**, and * stand for
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using a two-tailed test).
Dependent Variable
∆Bond Spread ∆Abnormal Bond Spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CEOSHARE0 -24.21* -11.7
[-1.84] [-1.15]
INTANGIBLE0 -228.6 -44.6
[-1.32] [-0.32]
ISSUENUM0 625.7** 346.7*
[2.60] [1.87]
∆RATING 23.2 24.6 6.5
[1.10] [1.21] [0.33]
∆BLIQ -1.1 -8.1 -1.0
[-0.06] [-0.49] [-0.07]
Number of Firms 25 30 31 25 30 31
R2 0.07 0.00 0.15 0.05 0.00 0.10
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Table XI: Difference in Differences Framework: High (Treat) vs. Low (Control) Strategic Firms
This table reports the estimated coefficients for the difference-in-difference regression framework. Firms are grouped based on
STRATV AR into high (i.e., above the sample median value) and low (i.e., below the sample median value) groups. A dummy
variable, STRATV AR_TREAT , is equal to one if STRATV AR0, which is high and zero if STRATV AR0 is low, is created
for each of three strategic variables (CEOSHARE0, INTANGIBLE0, and ISSUENUM0). The control variable is the well-
known determinant of bond spreads including credit rating (RATING), bond liquidity at an individual-level (BLIQ) and a
market-level (BMKTLIQ), firm size (FIRMSIZ), stock volatility (STOCKV OL), and market leverage (MKTLEV ). Time-
fixed effects are included for all model specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the group level, and the robust t-statistics
are given in brackets (***,**, and * stand for significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using a two-tailed test).
(1) (2) (3)
TRADING× CEOSHARE_TREAT -12.3**
[-29.96]
CEOSHARE_TREAT -3.8
[-0.84]
TRADING×INTANGIBLE_TREAT -38.4
[-5.43]
INTANGIBLE_TREAT 135.8*
[11.12]
TRADING×ISSUENUM_TREAT 33.0**
[15.22]
ISSUENUM_TREAT -27.3
[-5.96]
TRADING 22.3 16.3 -1.1
[5.93] [2.54] [-0.26]
RATING -14.3** -29.4 -8.8
[-25.97] [-4.41] [-0.38]
RATING2 2.4* 3.8 2.0
[12.23] [4.73] [1.41]
BLIQ -5.2 -5.4 -7.4
[-1.17] [-1.63] [-5.47]
BMKTLIQ -1.8 -2.1 -1.9
[-3.19] [-3.61] [-5.22]
FIRMSIZ -12.9 -1.0 -12.7
[-1.28] [-0.10] [-0.91]
STOCKVOL 249.8* 285.5** 255.1
[9.23] [15.22] [2.91]
MKTLEV 88.4 101.7 104.6
[4.63] [1.10] [4.88]
Time-Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Clustered Standard Errors Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 1,246 1,331 1,413
R2 0.50 0.48 0.50
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TTable XIII: Matching Estimation ResultsThis table reports the results of the propensity score matching, in which the I run the probit regression for the probabilityof CDS trading with explanatory variables a priori considered to predict the trading of CDS. In Panel A, coefficients on the
covariates are reported. MKTLEV is market leverage of firm measured as long-term debt divided by market value of total
assets, FIRMSIZ is firm size as a natural logarithm of long-term debt plus common equity, STOCKVOL is stock volatility as a
standard deviation of 60 prior day’s stock returns, PRFIT is profitability as earnings before tax and depreciation divided by total
assets, and FRSTDIS is a analyst’s forecast dispersion as the raw dispersion divided by the firm’s stock price. Raw dispersion is
computed as the cross-sectional standard deviation of the most recently revised quarterly earnings per share estimates. Panel B
reports the descriptive statistics of matching variables for both Traded and Matched firms. The t-statistics are given in brackets
(***,**, and * stand for significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using a two-tailed test).
Panel A: The Prediction of Probability of CDS Trading
Probability of CDS Trading
MKTLEV -0.0963
(0.30)
FIRMSIZ -0.0460
(0.03)
STOCKVOL 0.7877***
(0.28)
RATING 0.2135***
(0.07)
RATING2 -0.0216***
(0.00)
PRFIT 4.0595
(3.39)
FRSTDISP -81.8905**
(39.99)
Time Fixed Effects No
Industry Fixed Effects Yes
R2 10.12%
N 8,546
Panel B: Summary Statistics For Traded and Matched Firms
Traded Matched
N MEAN STD N Mean STD
MKTLEV 1,502 0.2363 0.1940 569 0.2844 0.2233
FIRMSIZ 1,502 9.2524 1.2223 569 9.6123 1.1027
STOCKVOL 1,480 0.3005 0.1791 580 0.3402 0.2175
RATING 1,513 7.1632 2.1780 582 7.2182 2.5267
PRFIT 1,511 0.0257 0.0182 569 0.0232 0.0188
FRSTDISP 1,335 0.0012 0.0020 562 0.0014 0.0031
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Table XIV: Results for the Propensity Score Matching on the Time of CDS Introduction
This table reports the results of the propensity score matched sample analysis, in which the coefficients on the interaction terms
of TRADING with each of the three renegotiation variables, namely CEOSHARE0, INTANGIBLE0, and ISSUENUM0,
are estimated with the matched sample added to the original sample. The same regression models are estimated (shown in
Table V through Table VII). Panels A, B, and C present the results for the regression for CEOSHARE0, INTANGIBLE0, and
ISSUENUM0, respectively. All three proxies are measured in the quarter before the onset of CDS trading. To conserve the
space, only coefficients on the TRADING variable and interaction terms are reported. The t-statistics are given in brackets
(***,**, and * stand for significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using a two-tailed test).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Shareholder Bargaining Power
TRADING × CEOSHARE0 -6.9*** -8.1*** -6.0** -6.7***
[-2.57] [-2.76] [-2.01] [-2.61]
TRADING 56.4*** 53.8*** 54.8** 47.1***
[3.76] [4.03] [3.92] [3.77]
R2 0.34 0.38 0.40 0.42
Number of Observations 1,810 1,810 1,736 1,698
Number of Firms 163 163 163 162
Panel B: Liquidation Cost
TRADING × INTANGIBLE0 -47.2 -55.0 -89.8 -123.9**
[-0.63] [-0.91] [-1.42] [-2.18]
TRADING 68.2 67.4* 93.3** 102.2***
[1.43] [1.78] [2.38] [2.82]
R2 0.31 0.35 0.37 0.40
Number of Observations 1,974 1,974 1,891 1,843
Number of Firms 179 179 179 178
Panel C: Renegotiation Frictions
TRADING × ISSUENUM0 115.9* 118.0** 131.7** 137.1**
[1.91] [2.12] [2.15] [2.25]
TRADING 11.9 7.9 8.9 -1.1
[0.64] [0.44] [0.46] [-0.06]
R2 0.34 0.38 0.39 0.42
Number of Observations 2,048 2,048 1,963 1,920
Number of Firms 184 184 184 183
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